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Abstract
This paper proposes a new empirical measure of disinflation credibility and applies it to the
IMF-supported disinflation program in Turkey since the 2001 crisis. This measure relies only
on the consumer price index and can thus be easily applied in countries in which asset prices
and survey inflation expectations are not available or reliable. The application to Turkey’s
shows that it is less volatile and hence more reliable than a survey-expectation based
measure.
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I.   INTRODUCTION  
Credibility is easy to define, but it is difficult to measure. Credibility can be thought of as the 
public’s degree of uncertainty regarding the government’s true policy objectives. Policy 
credibility  can thus be measured as the probability, as assessed by agents, that policy 
outturns coincide with publicly announced policy targets. While there are several approaches 
in the literature (see Agenor and Taylor, 1993, for short surveys), in practice, central banks 
and market analysts often use asset prices and inflation expectation surveys to assess 
monetary policy credibility.  
 
Inflation expectation surveys and asset price measures of inflation expectations are often not 
available in emerging economies, and even if available, they have severe limitations in such 
countries. There, domestic bond markets are not deep and liquid enough, and financial 
market participants don’t have sufficient incentives to reveal their expectations. Credibility 
measures so constructed also do not represent expectations of actual price setters 
(e. g., workers and firms). 
 
This paper proposes a measure of disinflation credibility that can be used whenever there is a 
publicly announced inflation target and a public inflation forecast (e.g., in the budget), and 
applies it to the disinflation program in Turkey since the 2001 crisis. Following Baxter 
(1985), this measure is the probability that the estimated parameters of an econometric model 
of the disinflation process are consistent with those implicit in the government’s announced 
objectives. This measure uses only the consumer price index, which is available and 
relatively reliable in most developing economies and hence embeds also information on price 
and wage setting behavior of workers and firms. 
 
In the application, we find that it yields the same qualitative results as a survey-based 
measure, but is much less volatile and hence a more reliable credibility indicator for policy 
makers and analysts. 
 
The next section describes the methodology and illustrates the steps we follow in the 
application. Section III reports the results of the application. Section IV concludes. 
 
 
II.   METHODOLOGY  
Like Baxter (1985), we assume that the representative agent “learns” in a Bayesian manner. 
Unlike Baxter (1985), we focus on the final objective, inflation, rather than the intermediate 
target of monetary policy. We assume agents know the econometric model of the inflation 
process, but have only beliefs (i.e., prior probability distributions) on its parameters. They 
update these beliefs on the basis of realizations of the inflation process, through the Bayes’ 
rule, to form posterior distributions on the model parameters. By integrating these posterior 
densities, we can calculate the probability that the true parameters of the inflation process are 
consistent with those implicit in the publicly announced policy target, after each realization 
of the inflation process. 
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To implement this methodology, we need (i) an econometric model of the disinflation 
process, (ii) a mapping from the government’s  policy objectives to the parameter values of 
this model, and (iii) an estimation procedure to implement econometrically Bayesian learning 
about these parameters and compute their posterior distributions. 
 
 
For simplicity, the econometric model of the disinflation process that we posit is a first order 
autoregression: 
 
(1)  ∆πt = α + β ∆πt-1 + e t ,  e t~N(0, σ
2) 
 
This model characterizes the average speed of inflation or disinflation (α), the conditional 
persistence of temporary deviations from this average (β), and the conditional volatility of 




The mapping from the authorities’ policy objectives to the parameter values of the 
disinflation process  relies on the publicly announced inflation targets and publicly made 
inflation forecasts under a formal or informal inflation targeting framework (in the 
application to Turkey, targets and forecasts are those agreed under the stabilization program 
supported by the IMF).
3 From these targets and forecasts, it is possible to construct a 
projected monthly inflation path. Equation (1) can then be estimated on monthly series of 
actual data, up to the announcement of a new target (till the month before the announcement 
of the IMF program in our application to Turkey), and the projected monthly path, from the 
month of the announcement (the month of the program approval in our application) to the 
end of the projection period (24 months in most inflation targeting frameworks). This 
regression provides a set of coefficients for equation (1), consistent with the announced 
disinflation objectives in the absence of shocks, which we call “Program” coefficients. 
 
These “Program” coefficients, denoted α(P), β(P), and σ(P), are the subject of our credibility 
analysis. Different programs may result in different parameter values, but the sign of α(P) 
should always be negative while moving from a situation of high and persistent inflation to 
one of low and stable inflation. In other words, a genuine commitment to taming inflation 
must imply a shift in this coefficient—from α≥0 to α(P)<0—during the stabilization process. 
In practice, shocks will cause the actual inflation path after the announcement of a new 
inflation target to deviate from the projected path. But actual inflation should decline at the 
projected average rate, α(P), if the government sticks to its declared inflation objectives 
firmly. 
 
                                                 
2 Many rational expectation models of the monetary transmission mechanism imply such a 
univariate, reduced form representation for the inflation process (e.g., Kapetanios, Pagan, and 
Scott, (2005). 
3  Inflation targets may be revised over time, and these changes are taken into account 
accordingly (in the application to Turkey, by considering two successive IMF programs).    - 4 -
The recursive application of Bayes’ rule implements Bayesian learning econometrically. 
Theil’s (1971) mixed estimator permits computing the Bayes’ rule after each realization of 
the inflation process, thus providing for a very simple estimation procedure. Given agents’ 
initial beliefs—proxied by a prior distribution on the coefficients of (1)—and the true model 
of the disinflation process—the likelihood function of (1)—mixed estimation of equation (1) 
updates agent’s beliefs, and provides posterior distributions of α(t), for each t = T,..., T+K, 
where T is the month of the inflation target announcement and T+K is the last month of the 
projection period over which credibility is assessed. 
 
By iterating this procedure, we obtain a series of probabilities that α(t) ≤α(P), for t =T, ..., 
T+K, which is our credibility measure. For instance, given agents’ prior on the model 
parameters at time T-1, say α(T-1), where T-1 is the month before the inflation target 
announcement, mixed estimation of equation (1) over the sample period from T-S to T, 
where S is the fixed-length of the estimation window, provides a posterior distribution of 
α(T). The posterior distribution of α(T) can then be used as prior for α(T+1), and the 
posterior at time T+1 as prior at T+2, and so and so on. Given the sequence of posterior 
distributions, which are approximately normal if computed based on mixed estimation of (1), 




III.   AN APPLICATION: MEASURING DISINFLATION CREDIBILITY IN TURKEY 
In this section we apply the methodology above to Turkey’s IMF-supported disinflation 
program after the 2001 crisis.
4 Following the financial crisis of February 2001, the launch of 
a new program in May 2001 provides our starting point of the empirical analysis. The 
credibility analysis extends through March 2004, and encompasses a second IMF program 
approved in February 2002, as well as both domestic (mainly political) and external shocks 
(such as September 11, 2001 and the Iraq war). 
 
                                                 
4 Celasun, Gelos, and Prati (2005) analyze the determinants of monetary credibility in Turkey 
and other emerging market economies.    - 5 -


































































































































































































































Projection under 2001 Program
Projection under 2002 Program
 
 
We use two sets of program coefficients—since we consider two IMF-supported programs—
and one set of prior coefficients (Table 1). The first set of program coefficients (2001 
Program) is obtained on historical data from June 1995 to April 2001—the month before  the 
new IMF program was approved in May 2001—and projections from May 2001 to 
December 2002, which was the end of 2001 Program’s projection period. The second set of 
program coefficients (2002 Program) is obtained based on historical data from June 1995 to 
January 2002—the month before the second IMF program we consider was approved—and 
projections from February 2002 to December 2004—the end of the 2002 Program’s 
projection period. For both programs, the annual inflation targets are those published in the 
respective letter of intent with the IMF (available at www.imf.org). 
 
We derive monthly inflation projections by assuming a constantly decreasing monthly 
inflation rate (Figure 1, dashed and dotted lines)—that is, by assuming a gradual disinflation 
path in the absence of shocks. We then check the sensitivity of the results to using actual 
monthly inflation projections under these two IMF-supported programs, which are not 
reported because they are confidential. 
 
Prior coefficients are estimated by fitting equation (1) over the period preceding the 2001 
IMF program—June 1995–April 2001. Consistent with a standard two-year forecasting 
horizon under most inflation targeting regimes, we set S, the constant width of the data 
window rolled over time, equal to 24 months and then check the sensitivity of the results to 
alternative values. 
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Value t-statistic Value t-statistic Value t-statistic
α -0.38 -1.40 -0.28 -1.24 -0.16 -0.48
β 0.39 4.31 0.46 6.03 0.39 3.56
No. of observations 91 115 71




Table 1. Priors and Program Coefficients
2002 Program coefficients Prior coefficients




Estimated 2001 program coefficients imply an acceleration of the disinflation process and a 
reduction of the uncertainty surrounding the central projection path compared to the 
disinflation history. The projected average decline in inflation under the 2001 program is 
twice as large as that implied by the prior and is much less uncertain. The estimated 2002 
program coefficients imply a slight deceleration in the disinflation process, without altering 
the degree of uncertainty around the central projection path. 
 
Figure 1 shows that our Bayesian credibility measure (solid line) is much less responsive to 
shocks than a measure based on survey inflation expectations (dashed line).
5 So our measure 
is much less volatile and hence a more reliable credibility indicator for policy makers and 
market analysts than the survey-based one. There is no commonly used asset price-based 
measure of inflation credibility in Turkey to compare with our Bayesian credibility measure, 
highlighting the importance to have alternative, simple, readily available credibility measures 
in emerging market countries. 
 
                                                 
5 The survey-based credibility measure is computed as the difference between monthly 
inflation projections and expected inflation in the survey conducted by the central bank of 
Turkey available at www.tcmb.gov.tr.     - 7 -

































































































































































































































Sources: Central Bank of Turkey inflation survey; and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
This result is robust to the use of alternative priors (computed by including observations 
starting in  June 1991) and different estimation windows (i.e., S equal 18, 36 or 48 moths). 
The results are robust also to the use of actual inflation projections under the two IMF-
supported programs considered. 
 
IV.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presented a measure of disinflation credibility that does not rely on asset prices or 
survey inflation expectations, which have limited applicability in emerging markets. Our 
measure only relies on the aggregate CPI index, which is available and reliable even in most  
low-income countries. It also embeds information on actual price and wage setting behavior 
more fully than estimates of this behavior by financial markets participants. Our measure is 
easily applied in the context of IMF-supported programs, which provide for both an inflation 
objective and inflation projections, but can be  applied to any  inflation-targeting framework 
in which the inflation forecasts are published. The application to Turkey’s IMF-supported 
disinflation program clearly indicates that our measure is less volatile and hence more 
reliable than a survey-based measure.    - 8 -
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